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§ 720 ILCS 5/17-3.  Forgery


   Sec. 17-3. Forgery. (a) A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:

(1) makes or alters any document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority; or

(2) issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or

(3) possesses, with intent to issue or deliver, any such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered; or

(4) unlawfully uses the digital signature, as defined in the Financial Institutions Digital Signature Act [205 ILCS 705/1 et seq.], of another; or

(5) unlawfully uses the signature device of another to create an electronic signature of that other person, as those terms are defined in the Electronic Commerce Security Act [5 ILCS 175/1 et seq.].

(b) An intent to defraud means an intention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property. As used in this Section, "document" includes, but is not limited to, any document, representation, or image produced manually, electronically, or by computer.

(c) A document apparently capable of defrauding another includes, but is not limited to, one by which any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property may be created, transferred, altered or terminated. A document includes any record or electronic record as those terms are defined in the Electronic Commerce Security Act [5 ILCS 175/1 et seq.].

(d) Sentence.

Forgery is a Class 3 felony.

HISTORY:  
Source: P.A. 77-2638; 90-575, § 90; 90-759, § 95-15; 91-357, § 237.

NOTES:
NOTE.
   This section was Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 38, para. 17-3.
 
ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
   See 59 Illinois Administrative Code, §§ 115.321, 119.261, 77 Illinois Administrative Code, §§ 210.2250, 220.2800, 225.1050, 245.72, 250.435, 260.1750, 270.2250, 295.3040, 350.681, 518.1610.
 
EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS.
   The 1998 amendment by P.A. 90-575, effective March 20, 1998, added subdivision (a)(4) and made a related change; and added the second sentence in subsection (b).
   The 1998 amendment by P.A. 90-759, effective July 1, 1999, added subsection (a)(4) and made minor stylistic changes; and in subsection (c) added the last sentence.
   The 1999 amendment by P.A. 91-357, effective July 29, 1999, amended this section before and after the amendment by P.A. 90-759. The version of this section amended after the amendment by P.A. 90-759, incorporated the amendments by P.A. 90-515 and P.A. 90-759, and made stylistic changes.

CASE NOTES
 
ANALYSIS

     Constitutionality

     --Equal Protection

     In General

     --Codified

     Accountability

     --Circumstantial Evidence

     --Evidence Held Sufficient

     Aliases

     Appellate Review

     --Resentencing Unnecessary

     Charging Instrument

     --Allegation of Mental State

     --Attachment of Forged Document

     --Attempt Forgery

     --Credit Card Sales Draft

     --Description of Forged Document

     --Document Capable of Defrauding

     --Identification of Drawee Bank

     --Identification of Intended Victim

     --Location of Offense

     --Misnomer

     --Sufficiency

     Compulsory Joinder

     Consistency of Verdicts

     --Official Misconduct Acquittal

     Conspiracy

     --Shown

     Construction and Application

     --Drugs by False Prescription

     --Endorsements of Joint Venture

     --False Security

     --Prior Forms of Offense

     --Prior Laws

     --Scope

     Deceptive Practices

     --Distinguished

     Delivery

     --Shown

     Discovery

     --Prosecutorial Obligation Breached

     --Surprise or Prejudice

     Document Capable of Defrauding

     --Document Capable of Defrauding

     --Certified Check

     --Construed

     --Credit Card Slip

     --Legal Efficacy

     --Overdue Check

     --Preprinted Bank Checks

     --Question of Fact

     --Reasonable Person Standard

     --Skill in Execution

     Elements of Proof

     --In General

     --Actual Fraud Unnecessary

     --Date of Offense

     --Evidence Held Insufficient

     --Evidence Held Sufficient

     --Intent to Defraud

     --Knowledge

     --Lack of Authority

     --Parties to Offense

     --Pecuniary Advantage Unnecessary

     --Separate and Distinct Offenses

     --Use of Fictitious Name

     --Venue

     --Witness to Fraudulent Instrument

     Evidence

     --Amissibility

     --Confession

     --Credibility of Defendant

     --Criminal Record of Witness

     --Handwriting Analysis

     --Identification

     --Illegal Search

     --Other Crimes

     --Same Transaction or Occurrence

     --Testimony by Defendant of Intent

     Fiduciary Impropriety

     --Distinguished

     Forged Documents

     --Airline Tickets

     --Charge Slip

     --Illustrative Cases

     --Indorsement in Violation of Authority

     --Negotiability

     Injured Party's Identity

     --In General

     --Corporate Existence

     --Setting Forth in Indictment

     Intent to Defraud

     --In General

     --Circumstantial Evidence

     --Defenses

     --Defined

     --Delivery

     --Established

     --Fictitious Driver's License

     --Presumption

     --Proof

     --Required

     Issue

     --Commercial Code Not Applicable

     Jury Instructions

     --Circumstantial Evidence

     --Document Capable of Defrauding

     --Elements of Offense

     --Error Causing Reversal

     --Held Sufficient

     --Intent

     Lesser Included Offenses

     --Deceptive Practices

     --Fuel Tax Violations

     Forgery

     Makes or Alters

     --Endorsement Included

     --Question of Law

     Multiple Offenses

     --Single Act

     Offenses Distinguished

     Probation Revocation

     --Harmless Error

     Prosecutorial Comments

     --Unavailable Witness

     Sentence

     --Conspiracy

     --Discretion of Court

     --Entitlement to Credit

     --Held Excessive

     --Held Not Excessive

     --Probation

     --Same Transaction or Occurrence

     --Term Proper

     --Upon Guilty Plea

     Theft

     --Distinctions

     --Distinguished

     Unauthorized Use

     --Stolen Credit Card

     Venue

     --Act of Defendant

     --Circumstantial Evidence

     --Established

     --Origin of Facsimile

     --Question of Fact

     --Uncontroverted
 

     CONSTITUTIONALITY
 

     --EQUAL PROTECTION
   Legislative classification of offense of signing name to a check drawn on either a fictitious bank or with knowledge of insufficient funds in depository as misdemeanor of deceptive practices, and classification of drawing checks with intent to defraud using name of another as purported maker as forgery carrying greater penalty, did not deprive defendant convicted of the latter of equal protection under Art. 2, § 11 of the Constitution of 1870 (see now Ill.Const. (1970), Art. I, § 11). People v. Lanners, 122 Ill. App. 2d 290, 258 N.E.2d 390 (2 Dist 1970).
 

     IN GENERAL
 

     --CODIFIED
   This statute did not change but merely codified prior Illinois decisions with respect to the offense of forgery. People v. Kelley, 129 Ill. App. 3d 920, 85 Ill. Dec. 204, 473 N.E.2d 572 (3 Dist. 1985).
   This section incorporates all traditional forms of forgery into a single crime, unlike prior statutes which described various forms of forgery with different penalties depending on the instrument involved. People v. Holloman, 30 Ill. App. 3d 822, 333 N.E.2d 509 (2 Dist. 1975).
 

     ACCOUNTABILITY
 

     --CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
   Guilt for forgery under an accountability theory can be shown by circumstantial evidence. People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 143 Ill. Dec. 92, 553 N.E.2d 799 (3 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 550, 144 Ill. Dec. 262, 555 N.E.2d 381 (1990).
 

     --EVIDENCE HELD SUFFICIENT
   The evidence was held sufficient to find defendant guilty of forgery under an accountability theory. People v. Passantino, 67 Ill. App. 3d 469, 24 Ill. Dec. 374, 385 N.E.2d 141 (2 Dist. 1979).
 

     ALIASES
   Where a document has been signed by a person using his own alias, he has not made a document which purports to have been made by another person. People v. Kelley, 129 Ill. App. 3d 920, 85 Ill. Dec. 204, 473 N.E.2d 572 (3 Dist. 1985).
   Even though defendant signed the check in question with a name by which she chose to be known instead of her actual name, the court could not have determined that the check purported to have been made by another. People v. Kollmann, 33 Ill. App. 3d 629, 342 N.E.2d 240 (5 Dist. 1975).
 

     APPELLATE REVIEW
 

     --RESENTENCING UNNECESSARY
   Although five theft convictions and the sentences thereon were vacated on appeal, it was unnecessary to remand for resentencing where the sentences of the remaining 147 counts for forgery were affirmed. People v. Einstein, 106 Ill. App. 3d 526, 62 Ill. Dec. 285, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (1 Dist. 1982).
 

     CHARGING INSTRUMENT
 

     --ALLEGATION OF MENTAL STATE
   Where the statutory definition of an offense includes the mental state with which the act is committed as an element of the offense, as in this section where the defendant's knowledge that a signature was forged was required, that knowledge or mental state must be alleged in the indictment. People v. Mager, 35 Ill. App. 3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     --ATTACHMENT OF FORGED DOCUMENT
   Where, in addition to the narrative allegations set forth in the information, the state also attached a copy of the relevant document and incorporated it into each respective count, the court approved of this common practice as a practical and efficient method to both apprise a defendant of the charge against her and to assist in the determination of a document's apparent capability to defraud another. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 197 Ill. Dec. 516, 631 N.E.2d 738 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill. 2d 565, 202 Ill. Dec. 929, 638 N.E.2d 1123 (1994).
   Where a photocopy of an allegedly forged prescription was made a part of the indictment, the indictment was not void for the failure to allege, or show, the defendant was possessed of an intention to defraud. People v. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724 (5 Dist. 1972).
   In an indictment for forgery, where the instrument itself was neither set out in the indictment in haec verba, nor was a true copy of it attached to the indictment, the indictment was insufficient to support a conviction. People v. Mustread, 94 Ill. App. 2d 440, 237 N.E.2d 348 (4 Dist. 1968).
 

     --ATTEMPT FORGERY
   Indictment charging defendant with attempted forgery, which failed to allege "failure" of the forgery, was not defective. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
 

     --CREDIT CARD SALES DRAFT
   A bank credit card sales draft is on its face complete, creates a legal obligation, and is sufficient to support an indictment for forgery. People v. Reynolds, 85 Ill. App. 3d 549, 40 Ill. Dec. 833, 407 N.E.2d 64 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --DESCRIPTION OF FORGED DOCUMENT
   It is not necessary in a forgery prosecution to attach to the charging instrument a copy of the document in question or set it out in haec verba, but it is permissible to give a description of the document. People v. Rennels, 227 Ill. App. 3d 263, 169 Ill. Dec. 250, 591 N.E.2d 130 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 146 Ill. 2d 645, 176 Ill. Dec. 815, 602 N.E.2d 469 (1992).
   An indictment for forgery no longer need include a copy of the document or set it forth in haec verba, but may instead give a description of the pertinent instrument. People v. Toolen, 116 Ill. App. 3d 632, 72 Ill. Dec. 41, 451 N.E.2d 1364 (5 Dist. 1983).
   Unlike common-law forgery, it is unnecessary under this section for an indictment to include an exact copy of the instrument ("tenor description"); it is sufficient that the instrument is described in narrative form showing its salient aspects ("purport description"). If, however, there is both a "tenor" and a "purport" description, they must be consistent. People v. Holloman, 30 Ill. App. 3d 822, 333 N.E.2d 509 (2 Dist. 1975).
   Where in each count of the forgery indictment the "document apparently capable of defrauding" was simply alleged to be either a guest registration card, a restaurant check, or a balance statement, and no further averment was made as to how these items were documents capable of defrauding, the indictment failed to adequately allege an essential element of forgery; thus such indictment was void and conferred no jurisdiction upon the trial court. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151 (5 Dist. 1975).
   Indictment which contained a narrative description of the instrument allegedly forged by defendant sufficiently informed the defendant of the charge he was called upon to defend. People v. Moyer, 1 Ill. App. 3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210 (4 Dist. 1971).
   An indictment on a forgery charge may depict the forged instrument by a "purport description," or in narrative form, and if it explicitly identifies and describes the instrument, it is not necessary that there also be a "tenor description." People v. Dzielski, 130 Ill. App. 2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426 (2 Dist. 1970).
   There is no requirement in a forgery indictment to set out the instrument verbatim, or by facsimile copy, since a purport or summary description of this instrument is sufficient to inform defendant of the charges against which he must defend, and protect defendant against double jeopardy. People ex rel. Miller v. Pate, 42 Ill. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 225 (1969).
   In forgery indictments the instrument or "document apparently capable of defrauding another," must be described, either by its purport or tenor, or by both. People v. Addison, 75 Ill. App. 2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511 (4 Dist. 1966).
 

     --DOCUMENT CAPABLE OF DEFRAUDING
   In an indictment for forgery, the document which is the subject of the charge must show on its face an apparent capacity to defraud another; otherwise, the indictment must include averments of extrinsic facts establishing such a capacity. People v. Reynolds, 85 Ill. App. 3d 549, 40 Ill. Dec. 833, 407 N.E.2d 64 (5 Dist. 1980).
   An indictment for forgery must indicate that the document was apparently capable of defrauding; thus, where the description of the document in itself does not show that it was capable of defrauding, extrinsic facts must be alleged sufficient to demonstrate its potential for fraudulent use. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151 (5 Dist. 1975).
 

     --IDENTIFICATION OF DRAWEE BANK
   If a forged instrument is a check, the description of the instrument set forth in an indictment must identify inter alia the drawee bank. People v. Davis, 71 Ill. App. 3d 662, 27 Ill. Dec. 724, 389 N.E.2d 955 (3 Dist. 1979).
 

     --IDENTIFICATION OF INTENDED VICTIM
   A charging instrument alleging forgery need not allege, and the state need not prove, the person whom defendant intended to defraud. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 197 Ill. Dec. 516, 631 N.E.2d 738 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill. 2d 565, 202 Ill. Dec. 929, 638 N.E.2d 1123 (1994).
 

     --LOCATION OF OFFENSE
   An indictment charging defendant with committing a forgery in a named county, by drawing three separate checks on the First National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, was not defective in that the location of the crime was not stated as definitely as could have been done. People v. Shockey, 67 Ill. App. 2d 133, 213 N.E.2d 573 (2 Dist. 1966).
 

     --MISNOMER
   Where the allegedly forged document was an Illinois government check having no drawee bank which could be identified in the indictment, use of the word "check" in the indictment presented a misnomer question and not a question concerning the failure to set forth in an indictment the material elements of an offense. People v. Davis, 71 Ill. App. 3d 662, 27 Ill. Dec. 724, 389 N.E.2d 955 (3 Dist. 1979).
 

     --SUFFICIENCY
   When the document's apparent ability to defraud is not clear from its face, the charging instrument must set forth the state's explanation why the document is apparently capable of defrauding, but not necessarily evidentiary matters the state plans to introduce at trial supporting that belief. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 197 Ill. Dec. 516, 631 N.E.2d 738 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill. 2d 565, 202 Ill. Dec. 929, 638 N.E.2d 1123 (1994).
   Any inclusion of an identified intended victim is surplusage, regardless of whether that person was capable of being defrauded, and therefore need not be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of a charging instrument. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 197 Ill. Dec. 516, 631 N.E.2d 738 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill. 2d 565, 202 Ill. Dec. 929, 638 N.E.2d 1123 (1994).
   An information which charges an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient if the words of the statute particularize the offense so that a defendant is apprised, with reasonable certainty, of the precise offense; thus, defendant's assertion that additional allegations were required, such as the identity of the party defrauded, lacked merit, as the state is not required to prove that anyone was, in fact, defrauded. People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
   Where an indictment charged that a defendant with the intent to defraud, knowingly delivered a certain draft knowing that said draft and order for the payment of money was endorsed in such manner that it purported to have been endorsed with the authority of the co-payees and knowing that neither had given such authority, and that defendant with intent to defraud, knowingly endorsed the draft in such manner that it purported to have been made by the authority of them, the indictment was sufficient to enable defendant to prepare his defense because it informed him of the charges against him, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the forgery counts. People v. Martin-Trigona, 111 Ill. App. 3d 718, 67 Ill. Dec. 291, 444 N.E.2d 527 (1 Dist. 1982).
   An indictment was sufficient to charge the crime of forgery where it alleged that defendant delivered a check which, when presented by defendant, was already capable of defrauding; thus, no further allegations were necessary. People v. Mays, 38 Ill. App. 3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235 (3 Dist. 1976).
   Where indictment alleged that a prescription was "apparently capable of defrauding another in that it purported to have been made by another," and also alleged that defendant committed the requisite acts, "knowing said document to have been thereby made," there was a sufficient reference in the last quoted clause of the indictment by use of the word "thereby" to sustain the indictment. People v. Mager, 35 Ill. App. 3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389 (5 Dist. 1976).
   Where the described instrument, by omitting the amount and the payee, could not be a check and could not be a document capable of defrauding another unless extrinsic facts were averred giving it such character, the information did not charge an offense. People v. Moats, 8 Ill. App. 3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285 (3 Dist. 1972).
   Forgery indictment which included the date of the check, the party it was payable to, the amount, the drawer, and the bank, was sufficient, and the number of the check. the color, the number of the account, or other descriptive features, were not necessary to explicitly identify the check in question. People v. Dzielski, 130 Ill. App. 2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426 (2 Dist. 1970).
   Where indictment did not undertake to set out the forged instrument as words and figures, or by attaching a photo, or other form of exact copy, and there was no averment that the instrument was in the possession of the accused, destroyed or otherwise not accessible to the grand jury, the indictment was insufficient to charge an offense. People v. Dawdy, 87 Ill. App. 2d 424, 230 N.E.2d 883 (4 Dist. 1967).
   The requirement of due process was adequately served where indictment for forgery was couched in the language of the statute--a practice long since approved--and the complaint leveled against it might well have been resolved by a bill of particulars, if deemed necessary or desirable for a proper defense. People v. Haynes, 73 Ill. App. 2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 489 (4 Dist. 1966).
   A forgery indictment, although bearing a surface disparity in the purport and tenor clauses as to who was the maker of the forged instrument, was sufficient to state an offense, where the clauses referred to the same instrument. People v. Addison, 75 Ill. App. 2d 358, 220 N.E.2d 511 (4 Dist. 1966).
   An indictment based solely upon the testimony of the county sheriff, who testified before the grand jury that he did not know of his own knowledge the acts, deeds, transactions or events upon which the indictment was based, was not insufficient. People v. McCracken, 61 Ill. App. 2d 457, 209 N.E.2d 673 (2 Dist. 1965).
   Indictment charging that defendant forged a check, drawn on the First National Bank of Decatur, for $44.08, purporting to have been executed "for the payment of money then and there to him the said Edward Grass, by the name then and there of "Clyde Davis Henely' with intent then and there to prejudice, damage and defraud one R. S. Bass," was sufficient to charge defendant with forgery. People v. Grass, 398 Ill. 364, 75 N.E.2d 756 (1947).
   Indictment charging that defendant feloniously and fraudulently did then and there utter, publish and pass to another person as true and genuine, a certain false and forged bank check, then and there purporting to have been signed knowing the said bank check to be false and forged, with the intent thereby then and there to prejudice, damage and fraud was sufficient to charge defendant with the offense of forgery. People v. Lantz, 387 Ill. 72, 55 N.E.2d 78 (1944).
   It is not necessary to allege that the instrument forged, if genuine, would create a legal liability, but the essential elements of the crime are a false making of an instrument in writing apparently capable of effecting a fraud, together with a fraudulent intent. People v. Ciralsky, 360 Ill. 554, 196 N.E. 733 (1935).
 

     COMPULSORY JOINDER
   Indictment for forgery was not subject to compulsory joinder provisions requiring action be joined with earlier indictments for violations of Illinois Motor Fuel Tax Act (IMFTA) (35 ILCS 505/1), where IMFTA charges were based on defendant's alleged failure to pay taxes, file returns, or obtain license for distribution of motor fuel, and forgery charges were based on active misrepresentation of his authority to purchase motor fuel to evade his obligation to pay motor fuel taxes. People v. Schram, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 220 Ill. Dec. 225, 672 N.E.2d 1237 (1 Dist. 1996).
 

     CONSISTENCY OF VERDICTS
 

     --OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT ACQUITTAL
   Defendant's conviction of forgery (a predicate offense) was not legally inconsistent with her acquittal of official misconduct (a dependent offense). People v. Fiore, 169 Ill. App. 3d 601, 120 Ill. Dec. 85, 523 N.E.2d 996 (1 Dist. 1988).
 

     CONSPIRACY
 

     --SHOWN
   The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit forgery where defendant drove friends to a bank to cash stolen and forged public aid checks. People v. Charleston, 46 Ill. App. 3d 141, 4 Ill. Dec. 709, 360 N.E.2d 822 (4 Dist. 1977).
 

     CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION
 

     --DRUGS BY FALSE PRESCRIPTION
   The Illinois Controlled Substances Act (subsection (b) of 720 ILCS 570/406) does not prevent prosecution under this section for presenting a false prescription to a pharmacist, even though this section may provide for a greater sentence. People v. Henderson, 71 Ill. 2d 53, 15 Ill. Dec. 654, 373 N.E.2d 1338 (1978).
   The legislature intended the forgery section of the Criminal Code to be used to cover the improper obtaining of drugs by a false prescription. People v. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724 (5 Dist. 1972).
 

     --ENDORSEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURE
   Where two or more attorneys are jointly retained on a contingent fee basis to prosecute a claim on behalf of a client, so that the attorneys' relationship may be characterized as a joint venture, it is not forgery for one of the attorneys to endorse, in the name of all the joint venturers, a settlement draft payable to all the joint venturers, for the purpose of facilitating a prompt deposit of funds into a client trust account. In re Johnson, 133 Ill. 2d 516, 142 Ill. Dec. 112, 552 N.E.2d 703 (1989).
 

     --FALSE SECURITY
   Giving a false security in the form of a promissory instrument has been recognized as the subject of a forgery. People v. Hackbert, 13 Ill. App. 3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777 (2 Dist. 1973).
 

     --PRIOR FORMS OF OFFENSE
   As presently defined in the new Criminal Code, the offense of forgery codifies and incorporates all prior forms of forgery into a single crime. People v. Merchant, 5 Ill. App. 3d 636, 283 N.E.2d 724 (5 Dist. 1972).
 

     --PRIOR LAWS
   Former section 277 (see now this section) made no distinction between making, altering or counterfeiting an instrument with intent to prejudice, and uttering, publishing and passing as true and genuine any such forged instrument with intent to damage or defraud, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited. People v. Lantz, 387 Ill. 72, 55 N.E.2d 78 (1944).
   Former section 277 of the Criminal Code (see now this section), was not directed solely against forgery of signatures, but included false making, altering, and counterfeiting, when done with the intent to damage or defraud any person. People v. Kubanek, 370 Ill. 646, 19 N.E.2d 573 (1939).
   The passing and uttering of a forged note is not a separate crime from that of causing such an instrument to be uttered and passed. People v. Whitmer, 369 Ill. 317, 16 N.E.2d 757 (1938).
   Every person who was guilty either of making and forging or, uttering and passing or attempting to utter and pass, under the conditions named prior similar law (see now this section) was deemed guilty of forgery. People v. Pfeiffer, 243 Ill. 200, 90 N.E. 680 (1909).
 

     --SCOPE
   This statute makes no distinction between making, altering or counterfeiting an instrument with intent to prejudice, an uttering, publishing and passing as true and genuine any such forged instrument with intent to damage or defraud, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited therefore, every person who is guilty either of making and forging or uttering and passing, or attempting to utter and pass, under the conditions named in the statute, is deemed guilty of forgery. People v. Brown, 397 Ill. 92, 72 N.E.2d 859 (1947).
 

     DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
 

     --DISTINGUISHED
   Forgery requires only the intent to defraud, while deceptive practices requires the intent to defraud and the intent to pay for or gain control over the property or money of another. People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975).
 

     DELIVERY
 

     --SHOWN
   In a prosecution for forgery, forged document was delivered within the meaning of this section, when defendant released, surrendered or handed over the letter to be faxed to real estate firm with which defendant was negotiating a lease. People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 164 Ill. Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991).
   The statute defining forgery does not require delivery of an instrument to constitute the offense if the instrument was made with the intent to defraud, but, even if that were an essential element of the offense of forgery, it was satisfied where a co-conspirator went to a bank vice-president with the check in her hand, gave it to him to open a savings account, and left the check with him when she hurriedly departed the bank after the check's worthlessness was discovered, even though the vice-president did not forthwith accept it as genuine. People v. Passantino, 67 Ill. App. 3d 469, 24 Ill. Dec. 374, 385 N.E.2d 141 (2 Dist. 1979).
 

     DISCOVERY
 

     --PROSECUTORIAL OBLIGATION BREACHED
   Where in a prosecution for forgery the prosecutor confessed that he simply did not request information relating to his witness' criminal record from police or other state authorities, the prosecutor did not in good faith attempt to discharge his discovery obligation toward the defendant. People v. Stokes, 121 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 Ill. Dec. 854, 459 N.E.2d 989 (2 Dist. 1984).
 

     --SURPRISE OR PREJUDICE
   Defendant was in no position to claim surprise or prejudice concerning drafts held by the prosecution, since the drafts were admittedly of his own making, and he certainly knew of their existence, and availability. People v. Custer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753 (5 Dist. 1972).
 

     DOCUMENT CAPABLE OF DEFRAUDING
 

     --DOCUMENT CAPABLE OF DEFRAUDING
   The issue of whether a document is apparently capable of defrauding is an element of the offense of forgery. People v. Mattingly, 180 Ill. App. 3d 573, 129 Ill. Dec. 573, 536 N.E.2d 257 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 136 Ill. Dec. 599, 545 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. 1989).
   In an indictment for forgery, the instrument which is the subject of the charge must show on its face an apparent capacity to defraud another, or, if it does not, the indictment must include averments of extrinsic facts which establish that capacity. People v. Panagiotis, 162 Ill. App. 3d 866, 114 Ill. Dec. 125, 516 N.E.2d 280 (1 Dist. 1987).
 

     --CERTIFIED CHECK
   Where a bank's certification of a check was forged, the capacity of the check bearing it to be used for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding any person to whom it might be uttered as a genuine certified check was apparent without the allegation of any extrinsic fact. People v. Wilmot, 254 Ill. 554, 98 N.E. 973 (1912).
 

     --CONSTRUED
   A document capable of defrauding another is one which has some legal significance, and could be falsely made or altered. People v. Roberts, 27 Ill. App. 3d 489, 326 N.E.2d 116 (3 Dist. 1975).
 

     --CREDIT CARD SLIP
   A credit card sales slip was not "a document apparently capable of defrauding another," and the failure to allege the existence of the credit cards was not fatal to a defendant's indictment for forgery. People v. Roberts, 27 Ill. App. 3d 489, 326 N.E.2d 116 (3 Dist. 1975).
 

     --LEGAL EFFICACY
   Because the letter that defendant wrote under another teacher's name to the judge created a legal obligation to consider its contents when sentencing defendant, it was capable of having a legal effect and was a proper subject of a forgery charge. People v. Muzzarelli, 331 Ill. App. 3d 118, 264 Ill. Dec. 536, 770 N.E.2d 1232 (3 Dist. 2002).
   The mere acknowledgment of the receipt of the certificate of probation signed by the defendant was not a document capable of defrauding another within the plain meaning of the forgery statute, as an instrument without apparent legal efficacy or incapable of affecting the rights of another has been repeatedly held to fail as a requisite subject for the offense of forgery. People v. Kelley, 129 Ill. App. 3d 920, 85 Ill. Dec. 204, 473 N.E.2d 572 (3 Dist. 1985).
   An instrument without apparent legal efficacy or incapable of affecting the rights of another cannot be the subject of forgery. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     --OVERDUE CHECK
   The fact that a check may have been overdue was relevant only to the drawer's right to refuse payment on the check, and had no bearing on whether the check was "apparently capable of defrauding another" under this section. People v. Connell, 91 Ill. App. 3d 326, 46 Ill. Dec. 743, 414 N.E.2d 796 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --PREPRINTED BANK CHECKS
   Where the document in question was a preprinted bank check, it was readily apparent that it was capable of defrauding another; therefore, the failure to instruct on this element was not an error that severely threatened the fundamental fairness of defendant's trial. People v. Mattingly, 180 Ill. App. 3d 573, 129 Ill. Dec. 573, 536 N.E.2d 257 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 136 Ill. Dec. 599, 545 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. 1989).
 

     --QUESTION OF FACT
   Whether a document is apparently capable of defrauding is not a question of law but is a question for the fact finder. People v. Mattingly, 180 Ill. App. 3d 573, 129 Ill. Dec. 573, 536 N.E.2d 257 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 136 Ill. Dec. 599, 545 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. 1989).
 

     --REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
   A test for determining whether a forged document is apparently capable of defrauding another is whether a reasonable person might be deceived into accepting the document as genuine. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 197 Ill. Dec. 516, 631 N.E.2d 738 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 156 Ill. 2d 565, 202 Ill. Dec. 929, 638 N.E.2d 1123 (1994).
   The test of whether a document has the apparent ability to defraud another is whether a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the document as true and genuine; it is not necessary that the forged instrument be so skillfully prepared that it requires an expert to detect it. People v. Tarkowski, 106 Ill. App. 3d 597, 62 Ill. Dec. 367, 435 N.E.2d 1339 (2 Dist. 1982).
   The test of whether a document is apparently capable of defrauding another is whether a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the document as true and genuine. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976); People v. Turner, 179 Ill. App. 3d 510, 128 Ill. Dec. 159, 534 N.E.2d 179 (2 Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 565, 133 Ill. Dec. 676, 541 N.E.2d 1114 (1989).
   The test for determining whether a document is apparently capable of defrauding another, is whether a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the document as true and genuine, and whether it creates, transfers, alters or terminates any right, obligation or power with reference to any person or property. People v. Panagiotis, 162 Ill. App. 3d 866, 114 Ill. Dec. 125, 516 N.E.2d 280 (1 Dist. 1987).
 

     --SKILL IN EXECUTION
   The similarity which must exist between a forged instrument and the genuine, to make it apparently capable of defrauding, need only be such that the court, in reading the indictment, can say that a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the forged instrument as genuine; the forged instrument need not be so skillfully executed as to require an expert to detect its falsity. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     ELEMENTS OF PROOF
 

     --IN GENERAL
   In order to obtain a conviction for forgery, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person, with intent to defraud, knowingly makes, alters, issues, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver, a document apparently capable of defrauding another in such a manner that it purports to have been made by another. People v. Carr, 225 Ill. App. 3d 170, 167 Ill. Dec. 274, 587 N.E.2d 543 (1 Dist. 1992).
   A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly makes or alters any document capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or by authority of one who did not give such authority. People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 143 Ill. Dec. 92, 553 N.E.2d 799 (3 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 550, 144 Ill. Dec. 262, 555 N.E.2d 381 (1990).
   The elements of forgery are as follows: (1) a document apparently capable of defrauding another, (2) a making or altering of such document by one person in such manner that it purports to have been made by another, (3) knowledge by defendant that it has been thus made; (4) knowing delivery of the document, and (5) intent to defraud. People v. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 111 Ill. Dec. 892, 513 N.E.2d 138 (2 Dist. 1987).
   It is not necessary that another actually be defrauded and an instrument need not be in "due legal form" to be found capable of defrauding another. People v. Tarkowski, 106 Ill. App. 3d 597, 62 Ill. Dec. 367, 435 N.E.2d 1339 (2 Dist. 1982).
   This section specifically prohibits the unauthorized making or alteration of a document. People v. Martin-Trigona, 111 Ill. App. 3d 718, 67 Ill. Dec. 291, 444 N.E.2d 527 (1 Dist. 1982).
   Forgery consists of the intentional making, altering, issuing, delivery, or possession of a document, knowing it is fraudulent because it purports to be made by one who did not make it; such actions must occur with the intent to defraud. People v. Austin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 495, 48 Ill. Dec. 939, 417 N.E.2d 671 (1 Dist. 1981).
   Forgery is the delivery of a check knowing it to be fraudulent, in that it purports to be made by one who did not make it, with the intent to defraud. People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975).
   To constitute forgery the three following elements must exist: (1) there must be a false writing or alteration of an instrument, (2) the instrument as made must be apparently capable of defrauding, and (3) there must be an intent to defraud. People v. Dwyer, 342 Ill. 105, 173 N.E. 765 (1930); People v. Kramer, 352 Ill. 304, 185 N.E. 590 (1933); People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548 (1943); People v. Dauphin, 53 Ill. App. 2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166 (2 Dist. 1964).
 

     --ACTUAL FRAUD UNNECESSARY
   The making of an instrument is enough to constitute forgery, and consummation of the fraud is not necessary. People v. Henson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 183, 90 Ill. Dec. 761, 482 N.E.2d 1044 (4 Dist. 1985).
   The crime of forgery does not require that any person actually be defrauded of money or property; on the contrary, a person whose forgery is discovered when he tries to pass the document is nevertheless guilty of forgery. People v. Douglas, 86 Ill. App. 3d 668, 41 Ill. Dec. 817, 408 N.E.2d 239 (1 Dist. 1980).
   It is not required that someone be actually defrauded to sustain a conviction for forgery. People v. Eston, 49 Ill. App. 3d 747, 7 Ill. Dec. 448, 364 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1977); People v. Henderson, 71 Ill. 2d 53, 15 Ill. Dec. 654, 373 N.E.2d 1338 (1978); People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
 

     --DATE OF OFFENSE
   The date of forgery was not an essential ingredient of the crime of forgery, and it was therefore proper for the state to show that the crime could have occurred on a date other than that contained in the allegedly forced Instrument. People v. Custer, 11 Ill. App. 3d 249, 296 N.E.2d 753 (5 Dist. 1972).
   A necessary element of the offense of forgery is that the document in issue be apparently capable of defrauding another, and the charge must aver facts showing the capacity to defraud, unless the document is facially capable of defrauding another. People v. Spencer, 160 Ill. App. 3d 509, 112 Ill. Dec. 100, 513 N.E.2d 514 (4 Dist. 1987).
   A letter, purporting to be from an authoritative source and describing retirement benefits to which an individual was entitled, is facially capable of defrauding a financial institution when the letter was alleged to have been delivered to a financial institution or was possessed with the intend to deliver to such an institution. People v. Spencer, 160 Ill. App. 3d 509, 112 Ill. Dec. 100, 513 N.E.2d 514 (4 Dist. 1987).
   The capacity of a forged instrument to defraud need only be apparent, not actual; the test is whether a reasonable or ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the document as genuine. People v. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 111 Ill. Dec. 892, 513 N.E.2d 138 (2 Dist. 1987).
   That the document made must be apparently capable of defrauding another is an essential element of forgery and must be set forth in some fashion in the indictment. People v. Moats, 8 Ill. App. 3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285 (3 Dist. 1972).
   Unless the instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding, or such character is given it by extrinsic averments, forgery cannot be predicated upon it. People v. Moats, 8 Ill. App. 3d 944, 291 N.E.2d 285 (3 Dist. 1972).
   Complaint that charged forgery based on delivery of two checks which failed to include copies of the checks attached, and which identified only two parties to the instrument, the maker and the payee, and which mentioned no drawee bank, did not sufficiently identify the checks as being capable of defrauding another, and thus the court was without jurisdiction to accept defendant's guilty plea. People v. Teichler, 19 Ill. App. 3d 292, 311 N.E.2d 422 (2 Dist. 1974).
   One of the essential elements of the offense of forgery is that the accused made any document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purported to have been made by another. People v. Teichler, 19 Ill. App. 3d 292, 311 N.E.2d 422 (2 Dist. 1974).
 

     --EVIDENCE HELD INSUFFICIENT
   Where the information failed to allege the receipt's apparent capacity to defraud there was insufficient evidence to justify claim of forgery. People v. Rennels, 227 Ill. App. 3d 263, 169 Ill. Dec. 250, 591 N.E.2d 130 (5 Dist.), cert. denied, 146 Ill. 2d 645, 176 Ill. Dec. 815, 602 N.E.2d 469 (1992).
   Where defendant's conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence that defendant defrauded insurance company with a theft claim for a non-existent car, defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction must be reversed. People v. Brozan, 163 Ill. App. 3d 73, 115 Ill. Dec. 83, 517 N.E.2d 285 (1 Dist. 1987).
   Since the state failed to prove that defendant's acknowledgment of receipt of a certificate of the conditions of probation was made or altered by one person in such a manner that it purported to have been made by another, the requisite proof to establish the commission of the offense of forgery was insufficient, as the mere delivery of a document which purports to have been made by the person who in fact made it, regardless of what name the person chose to sign the document, does not establish the crime of forgery. People v. Kelley, 129 Ill. App. 3d 920, 85 Ill. Dec. 204, 473 N.E.2d 572 (3 Dist. 1985).
   Defendant was not proved guilty of making or preparing a false prescription. People v. Douglas, 86 Ill. App. 3d 668, 41 Ill. Dec. 817, 408 N.E.2d 239 (1 Dist. 1980).
   The evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under the former statutory provisions relating to forgery (see now this section). People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015 (1937).
   Evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of forgery. People v. Ciralsky, 360 Ill. 554, 196 N.E. 733 (1935).
 

     --EVIDENCE HELD SUFFICIENT
   Although statements which defendant made during sentencing to explain his conduct did not amount to a judicial confession negating his argument that the evidence did not establish forgery, the appellate court sustained defendant's conviction for forgery because evidence introduced at trial, which showed that defendant was in a car with two other people when he attempted to cash a bogus payroll check, proved every element of the crime. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 265 Ill. Dec. 342, 772 N.E.2d 380 (2 Dist. 2002).
   Where company owner's signature on the approved request form was genuine but he did not authorize defendant to cause an additional American Express card to be issued to himself, yet defendant filled out his name as an employee to receive an additional card on the corporate account, he did so other than as authorized inasmuch as company owner had repeatedly stated he had never authorized nor intended to authorize the issuance of an additional card on the corporate account and was guilty of forgery. People v. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d 742, 194 Ill. Dec. 496, 627 N.E.2d 1138 (4 Dist. 1993).
   Where defendant completed the date, signature, and amount portions of a check imprinted with the name of someone else, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the check was apparently capable of defrauding an ordinary and reasonable person. People v. Turner, 179 Ill. App. 3d 510, 128 Ill. Dec. 159, 534 N.E.2d 179 (2 Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 565, 133 Ill. Dec. 676, 541 N.E.2d 1114 (1989).
   Evidence supported findings that defendant, with intent to defraud, filled out 71 public aid prescriptions without the authorization of the named physicians, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, and that he delivered them to the Department of Public Aid, in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section. People v. Einstein, 106 Ill. App. 3d 526, 62 Ill. Dec. 285, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (1 Dist. 1982).
   Where a property association owner testified that when she received a purported judgment order, she believed the document to be valid, and that she consulted two attorneys over a period of one week before finally determining that the order was invalid, and where there was nothing in the record to indicate that she had any experience with the law of legal documents, the fact that the order she received was undated, unsigned and unverified was not decisive; thus, the decision of the jury that the purported default order had the apparent capability to defraud a reasonable and ordinary person was not disturbed, since it was supported by the evidence adduced at trial. People v. Tarkowski, 106 Ill. App. 3d 597, 62 Ill. Dec. 367, 435 N.E.2d 1339 (2 Dist. 1982).
   Proof of defendant's fingerprints upon stolen check and her unquestionably probative and valid confession made it apparent that defendant was guilty of the crime of forgery beyond all reasonable doubt. People v. Harris, 68 Ill. App. 3d 744, 24 Ill. Dec. 960, 386 N.E.2d 164 (2 Dist. 1979).
   Where the state's evidence established that defendant took his employer's checks, endorsed them, and deposited them in his personal account, and his attempts to show a tax fraud scheme by his employer was without support in the evidence, the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for theft and forgery. People v. Toellen, 66 Ill. App. 3d 967, 23 Ill. Dec. 686, 384 N.E.2d 480 (3 Dist. 1978).
   Evidence that defendant sought to confirm the authenticity of a forged check by displaying a crudely and obviously altered driver's license as to name, signature, date of birth and sex of the person to whom it had been issued supported the existence of an intent to defraud, and that the instrument was apparently capable of defrauding. People v. Eston, 49 Ill. App. 3d 747, 7 Ill. Dec. 448, 364 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1977).
   Where defendant was linked to a check drawn from a closed account, by his photograph on a regiscope, by the grocery total matching the amount of the check, by cash register identifying numbers stamped on the back of the check, and by the identification testimony of two witnesses, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of forgery. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976).
   The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Dwyer, 342 Ill. 105, 173 N.E. 765 (1930); People v. Dunham, 344 Ill. 268, 176 N.E. 325 (1931); People v. D'Andrea, 361 Ill. 526, 198 N.E. 698 (1935); People v. Whitmer, 369 Ill. 317, 16 N.E.2d 757 (1938); People v. Epping, 17 Ill. 2d 557, 162 N.E.2d 366 (1959); People v. Dauphin, 53 Ill. App. 2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166 (2 Dist. 1964); People v. Shockey, 67 Ill. App. 2d 133, 213 N.E.2d 573 (2 Dist. 1966); People v. Wildey, 86 Ill. App. 2d 274, 229 N.E.2d 882 (1 Dist. 1967); People v. Clark, 104 Ill. App. 2d 12, 244 N.E.2d 842 (3 Dist. 1969); People v. Hibbler, 1 Ill. App. 3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101 (5 Dist. 1971); People v. Haycraft, 3 Ill. App. 3d 974, 278 N.E.2d 877 (5 Dist. 1972); People v. Butler, 12 Ill. App. 3d 541, 298 N.E.2d 798 (4 Dist. 1973); People v. Tervin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656 (4 Dist. 1974); People v. Whitley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 917, 162 Ill. Dec. 459, 579 N.E.2d 1273 (5 Dist. 1991); People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975); People v. Parton, 40 Ill. App. 3d 753, 354 N.E.2d 12 (4 Dist. 1976); People v. Stokes, 121 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 Ill. Dec. 854, 459 N.E.2d 989 (2 Dist. 1984); People v. Stevens, 128 Ill. App. 3d 823, 84 Ill. Dec. 52, 471 N.E.2d 581 (4 Dist. 1984); People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985); People v. Christiansen, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 97 Ill. Dec. 38, 492 N.E.2d 241 (3 Dist. 1986); People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 164 Ill. Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991).
 

     --INTENT TO DEFRAUD
   In order to prove forgery, the state was required to show that defendant had the intent to defraud when he knowingly delivered to the bank a document, purportedly endorsed by another, which was apparently capable of defrauding. People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
 

     --KNOWLEDGE
   It was not necessary that defendant himself altered the check, but only that he knew of the alteration. People v. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 111 Ill. Dec. 892, 513 N.E.2d 138 (2 Dist. 1987).
   Knowledge that a check was not authentic must clearly be proved in order for a defendant to be convicted of forgery. People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975).
   Anyone authorized to make up the record or to execute the authentic matter of a public nature, will be guilty of forgery in former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 277 (see now this section) if he makes the record or executes the authentic matter, knowing that its contents are false and untrue, and if by so doing he intends to defraud either an individual or the body politic by which he was employed. People v. Mau, 377 Ill. 199, 36 N.E.2d 235 (1941).
 

     --LACK OF AUTHORITY
   The state is not required to prove defendant did not have authority to use another's name when endorsing checks. People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
 

     --PARTIES TO OFFENSE
   While intent to defraud may be presumed or inferred from proved facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, the intent, like the proof of the forgery or issuing of the forged instrument, must be connected with the person charged, or there is a failure of proof. People v. Ciralsky, 360 Ill. 554, 196 N.E. 733 (1935).
 

     --PECUNIARY ADVANTAGE UNNECESSARY
   Even though defendant did not obtain a pecuniary advantage and did not defraud a pharmacist or doctor by presenting a false prescription, she was guilty of forgery. People v. Henderson, 71 Ill. 2d 53, 15 Ill. Dec. 654, 373 N.E.2d 1338 (1978).
 

     --SEPARATE AND DISTINCT OFFENSES
   The passing of a forged instrument was a separate crime from attempting to pass it. People v. Whitmer, 369 Ill. 317, 16 N.E.2d 757 (1938).
 

     --USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME
   Where defendant admitted that he drew checks with intent to defraud, using the name of a fictitious person as the purported maker, the crime of forgery was properly charged. People v. Lanners, 122 Ill. App. 2d 290, 258 N.E.2d 390 (2 Dist 1970).
 

     --VENUE
   The charge that a crime was committed in a particular county is a material averment and must be proved to sustain a conviction. People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 242, 46 Ill. Dec. 698, 414 N.E.2d 751 (5 Dist. 1980).
   Defendant's presence in the automobile of a woman who submit forged prescription to a pharmacy, and his attempt to dispose of partially completed prescription forms, indicated his complicity, but did not establish that he knowingly made a document apparently capable of defrauding another in that county; therefore, venue had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant's conviction and sentence were reversed. People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 242, 46 Ill. Dec. 698, 414 N.E.2d 751 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --WITNESS TO FRAUDULENT INSTRUMENT
   A rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant actively and knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud a bank by signing a power of attorney as witness when he knew that the named donor of the instrument (who was dead) could not sign the document, and knew that it was going to be used to deceive the bank into refinancing a house in which he was living with the purported donor's widow. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the fraudulent nature of the document and was not innocently relying upon an attorney's assurance that it was legal to refinance a house in this manner. People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 143 Ill. Dec. 92, 553 N.E.2d 799 (3 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 550, 144 Ill. Dec. 262, 555 N.E.2d 381 (1990).
 

     EVIDENCE
 

     --AMISSIBILITY
   Defendant should not have been precluded from offering evidence to prove that a traveler's check, similar to the one allegedly forged by defendant, was forged and cashed after the defendant was in custody. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
 

     --CONFESSION
   Where defendant's statement acknowledged that he knew a check was not made by the person who appeared to have made it, and that despite this fact, he went to a store and attempted to have it cashed but was caught, defendant acknowledged all the essential elements of forgery; his statement was a confession, and an instruction given regarding the confession was proper. People v. Cartwright, 33 Ill. App. 3d 180, 337 N.E.2d 237 (4 Dist. 1975).
 

     --CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT
   Where the defendant's testimony was directly contrary to the testimony of the witness whose name appeared on a prescription, and the defendant initially lied to the police, the jury, as trier of fact, was entitled to believe the witness and not the defendant. People v. Mager, 35 Ill. App. 3d 306, 341 N.E.2d 389 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     --CRIMINAL RECORD OF WITNESS
   Because the trial of defendant for forgery basically hinged on the issue of credibility, the denial of evidence of prosecution witness' criminal record could not be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Stokes, 121 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 Ill. Dec. 854, 459 N.E.2d 989 (2 Dist. 1984).
 

     --HANDWRITING ANALYSIS
   The fact that a favorable handwriting analysis would weaken the State's case demonstrated the probativeness of a handwriting analysis; accordingly the trial court erred in vacating its order for a handwriting analysis. People v. Dickerson, 239 Ill. App. 3d 951, 179 Ill. Dec. 930, 606 N.E.2d 762 (4 Dist. 1992).
   Where it was not apparent that a handwriting analysis report which the state failed to disclose (if there was one) was likely favorable to the defendant or material to his guilt or innocence, the possible error was waived by failure of defendant to pursue the matter further at the trial level. People v. Mays, 38 Ill. App. 3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235 (3 Dist. 1976).
   The trier of facts, whether court or jury, may determine the genuineness of disputed handwriting specimens by comparison and without the benefit of expert opinion; however, the comparison must in the first instance, be made in open court in the presence of the defendant. People v. Harter, 4 Ill. App. 3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10 (2 Dist. 1972).
 

     --IDENTIFICATION
   There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of forgery where defendant was seen signing checks from a stolen check book, and where identification witness had the opportunity to view defendant at the store on two separate occasions, at close range and under bright fluorescent lights. People v. Hefner, 70 Ill. App. 3d 693, 27 Ill. Dec. 96, 388 N.E.2d 1059 (5 Dist. 1979).
   Identification discrepancies were not so important as to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, in view of a direct and unquestioned identification in court. People v. Mays, 38 Ill. App. 3d 182, 347 N.E.2d 235 (3 Dist. 1976).
 

     --ILLEGAL SEARCH
   Where defendant was arrested for vagrancy, and subsequently convicted of delivering a forged check with intent to defraud, which conviction was based on evidence seized during an invalid search incident to the arrest for vagrancy, defendant was deprived of substantial rights, and should receive a new trial. People v. Harter, 4 Ill. App. 3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10 (2 Dist. 1972).
 

     --OTHER CRIMES
   If evidence of other alleged forgeries and thefts by defendant from his employer had been admitted, there would have been no prejudice to defendant because the evidence would have merely shown his modus operandi. People v. Toellen, 66 Ill. App. 3d 967, 23 Ill. Dec. 686, 384 N.E.2d 480 (3 Dist. 1978).
   Although defendant's prior conviction for burglary, and the grant of sentence of probation with respect thereto were properly admitted to impeach defendant's credibility, in a prosecution for forgery, reference to probation revocation proceedings which described offenses of which defendant was not convicted was error, and the significance of such error was not completely eliminated by instructions that this type of evidence was limited to credibility of defendant's testimony; therefore, the cumulative effect of the foregoing errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial. People v. Mays, 3 Ill. App. 3d 512, 277 N.E.2d 547 (3 Dist. 1972).
   In prosecutions for forgery it was permissible to prove that about the same time the defendant had in his possession or passed or tried to pass other forged checks, to show intent or guilty knowledge. People v. Dunham, 344 Ill. 268, 176 N.E. 325 (1931).
 

     --SAME TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE
   Checks which were not in fact used in subsequent offenses but were all part of the same transaction were admissible to show intent of the defendant in committing the forgery. People v. Marks, 63 Ill. App. 2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548 (2 Dist. 1965).
 

     --TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT OF INTENT
   What the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense are, or may be, is always a matter to be proved on the trial, and the defendant may testify to his intention, which will go to the jury, and be considered by them in connection with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. Wohlford v. People, 148 Ill. 296, 36 N.E. 107 (1894).
 

     FIDUCIARY IMPROPRIETY
 

     --DISTINGUISHED
   Where defendant, executor of an estate, improperly drew a check on estate funds for his own purposes, he could not be convicted of forgery. People v. Lindquist, 97 Ill. App. 3d 894, 53 Ill. Dec. 653, 424 N.E.2d 66 (3 Dist. 1981).
 

     FORGED DOCUMENTS
 

     --AIRLINE TICKETS
   Airline tickets which appeared on their face to be genuine free promotional tickets, were not genuine because they had been issued without authority. In addition, the tickets created the obligation to provide transportation to the ticket holder, at least until the fraud was discovered. The tickets were fraudulent. People v. Panagiotis, 162 Ill. App. 3d 866, 114 Ill. Dec. 125, 516 N.E.2d 280 (1 Dist. 1987).
 

     --CHARGE SLIP
   A person who without authority signs another person's name to a sales slip may be guilty of forgery; the credit card itself establishes that there is a line of credit and the credit card slip, like a check, purports to make use of the credit and the document on its face is complete and sufficient to create a legal obligation; this constitutes forgery. People v. Murray, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 203 Ill. Dec. 644, 640 N.E.2d 303 (1 Dist. 1994).
 

     --ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
   Falsification of enrollment and registration data at university in order to obtain educational grant funds for persons who were not entitled to them constituted forgery. People v. East-West Univ., 163 Ill. App. 3d 44, 114 Ill. Dec. 327, 516 N.E.2d 482 (1 Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 119 Ill. 2d 562, 119 Ill. Dec. 390, 637 N.E.2d 595 (1988).
   In prosecution for forgery and pledging fraudulent stock evidence was sufficient to find that stock certificate was issued without corporation's authority. People v. Young, 19 Ill. App. 3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1974).
   Defendant's conduct, even assuming he intended that the check not be cashed because he would provide the cash later, was criminal because the forged check was delivered to the clerk in exchange for $30. People v. Hackbert, 13 Ill. App. 3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777 (2 Dist. 1973).
   Testimony of a deputy sheriff that the purported maker of the check was not listed in the public utility records, telephone books or city directories in both localities, coupled with testimony that the alleged maker of the check had no account in the payee bank, and that there never was an account in the name of the maker in the bank in question was adequate to establish the nonexistence of a fictitious maker. People v. Kosearas, 410 Ill. 456, 102 N.E.2d 534 (1951).
   Where defendant conceded that he presented check for payment and that he might have rightly been charged with an attempt to commit forgery under former (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, para. 277) the facts that the check was not endorsed and never cashed, did not preclude indictment for forgery. People v. Christison, 396 Ill. 549, 72 N.E.2d 185 (1947).
   If a person falsely signs the name of another person to a check and passes this forged check as true and genuine, with intent to defraud another, he is guilty of forgery, and is subject to prosecution under this former section. People v. Brown, 397 Ill. 92, 72 N.E.2d 859 (1947).
   Evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of conspiring to obtain money by forging and uttering a will. People v. Bydalek, 381 Ill. 330, 45 N.E.2d 849 (1942).
   Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for forgery of bonds, where the uncontradicted evidence was that certain bonds were forgeries, and that defendant deposited them with, and attempted to secure a loan on them from a bank, and there was also abundant evidence to justify the jury finding that defendant knew the bonds were forged. People v. Goldstein, 368 Ill. 50, 12 N.E.2d 642 (1937).
 

     --INDORSEMENT IN VIOLATION OF AUTHORITY
   Defendant, by filling in checks over the admittedly genuine signature of maker, but in violation of his authority, was guilty of forgery under former prior similar law (see now this section). People v. Kubanek, 370 Ill. 646, 19 N.E.2d 573 (1939).
 

     --NEGOTIABILITY
   In order to come within this section the forged instrument need not be negotiable. People v. Church, 366 Ill. 149, 7 N.E.2d 894 (1937).
 

     INJURED PARTY'S IDENTITY
 

     --IN GENERAL
   Whether or not forged check was made payable to store owner was of no consequence if he was the person it was intended to defraud. People v. Brown, 397 Ill. 92, 72 N.E.2d 859 (1947).
 

     --CORPORATE EXISTENCE
   Since the Act to Regulate Proof in Criminal Cases of June 3, 1889, provided that in all criminal prosecutions requiring proof of the legal existence of a corporation, use shall be prima facie evidence of such existence, and the evidence showed that the business which cashed a forged check did a banking business and had done so for 16 years, that it had officers, a cashier, and an assistant cashier, received deposits and paid checks, and that the defendant did business with the bank, had an account there, and his checks frequently went through the bank, the business was an organized body in the actual user of the privileges and franchises which the law confers upon banking corporations, and under the statute; prima facie evidence of the bank's lawful existence as a corporation was established. People v. Dunham, 344 Ill. 268, 176 N.E. 325 (1931).
 

     --SETTING FORTH IN INDICTMENT
   There is no statutory language found in this section defining forgery, or in 720 ILCS 5/111-3 which states the requirements for charging an offense, that requires the naming of a person to whom an instrument is delivered with intent to defraud. People v. White, 130 Ill. App. 2d 775, 267 N.E.2d 129 (4 Dist. 1971).
   Intent to defraud is an essential element of the crime of forgery, and must be included in the indictment, although the person defendant intended to defraud need not be named. People v. Marks, 63 Ill. App. 2d 384, 211 N.E.2d 548 (2 Dist. 1965).
   A forgery indictment containing an allegation of a general intent to defraud is sufficient despite failure to charge intent to defraud, and prejudice to a particular person. People v. Crough, 29 Ill. 2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248 (1963).
 

     INTENT TO DEFRAUD
 

     --IN GENERAL
   The forgery statute is concerned with the fraudulent intent involved in falsifying an instrument or knowingly delivering it; hence, the action is deemed criminal because of an intent to defraud, rather than because such an intent is directed toward a specific individual. People v. Crough, 29 Ill. 2d 485, 194 N.E.2d 248 (1963).
 

     --CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
   Intent to defraud may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 143 Ill. Dec. 92, 553 N.E.2d 799 (3 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 550, 144 Ill. Dec. 262, 555 N.E.2d 381 (1990).
   Intent to defraud may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, and if the forged documents is delivered, then this intent will be presumed. People v. Bokuniewicz, 160 Ill. App. 3d 270, 111 Ill. Dec. 892, 513 N.E.2d 138 (2 Dist. 1987); People v. Whitley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 917, 162 Ill. Dec. 459, 579 N.E.2d 1273 (5 Dist. 1991); People v. Carr, 225 Ill. App. 3d 170, 167 Ill. Dec. 274, 587 N.E.2d 543 (1 Dist. 1992).
   An intent to defraud may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. People v. Eston, 49 Ill. App. 3d 747, 7 Ill. Dec. 448, 364 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1977).
 

     --DEFENSES
   Chronic alcoholism does not deprive a person of his free will so as to incapacitate him from forming the requisite intent to commit the crime of forgery. People v. Hibbler, 1 Ill. App. 3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101 (5 Dist. 1971).
 

     --DEFINED
   Intent to defraud means an intention to cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate any right, obligation, or power with reference to any person or property. People v. Kunce, 196 Ill. App. 3d 388, 143 Ill. Dec. 92, 553 N.E.2d 799 (3 Dist.), cert. denied, 132 Ill. 2d 550, 144 Ill. Dec. 262, 555 N.E.2d 381 (1990).
 

     --DELIVERY
   If a forged instrument is delivered, the intent to defraud is presumed. People v. Eston, 49 Ill. App. 3d 747, 7 Ill. Dec. 448, 364 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1977).
 

     --ESTABLISHED
   Defendant, when he falsified barrel labels, intended to defraud the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) by causing it to assume there was a lower amount of hazardous waste on-site than there actually was and, therefore, he affected IEPA's right to monitor and regulate the hazardous waste at plant. Consequently, court did not err in convicting him of forgery. People v. Gawlak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 286, 212 Ill. Dec. 712, 657 N.E.2d 1057 (1 Dist. 1995).
   Where defendant informed a witness that he had had prior experience in forging checks, that he was good at doing so, admitted to the witness that he had served time for forgery, defendant's intent to defraud and that he knowingly made a check which was apparently capable of defrauding another was established; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence testimony that defendant had been convicted of a prior forgery. People v. Stout, 108 Ill. App. 3d 96, 63 Ill. Dec. 810, 438 N.E.2d 952 (2 Dist. 1982).
 

     --FICTITIOUS DRIVER'S LICENSE
   Defendant's use of a fictitious Illinois driver's license to confirm what were clearly false signatures on the back of two checks, was strong evidence of defendant's intent to defraud. People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
 

     --PRESUMPTION
   An intent to defraud may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and, if a forged instrument is uttered or offered, then this intent will be presumed. People v. Varellas, 138 Ill. App. 3d 820, 93 Ill. Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (2 Dist. 1985).
   When a forged instrument is uttered, the intent to defraud is presumed. People v. Katz, 356 Ill. 440, 190 N.E. 913 (1934).
 

     --PROOF
   Necessary criminal intent to defraud was shown where hotel clerk to whom defendant gave forged check was unaware that it was a forgery; therefore, even if defendant's explanation was accepted that the forged check was given as a security for a loan and that he intended to repay at a later time. People v. Hackbert, 13 Ill. App. 3d 427, 300 N.E.2d 777 (2 Dist. 1973).
 

     --REQUIRED
   A false signing of another's name to an instrument, without intent to defraud or deceive someone, does not constitute the crime of forgery. People v. Bailey, 15 Ill. 2d 18, 153 N.E.2d 584 (1958).
   Falsely signing another's name to an instrument, without intent to defraud or deceive someone, does not constitute the crime of forgery, and since intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of forgery, an indictment which fails to charge fraudulent intent is fatally defective. People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548 (1943).
 

     ISSUE
 

     --COMMERCIAL CODE NOT APPLICABLE
   The court refused to apply the definition of "issue" contained in the Uniform Commercial Code (subsection (a) of 810 ILCS 5/3-105), to the word "issue" as it appears in subsection (a) of this section, because it would be inconsistent with the broad language of the forgery statute, which speaks of "any document," not just a negotiable instrument, "apparently capable of defrauding another," not just a holder or remitter. People v. Stevens, 128 Ill. App. 3d 823, 84 Ill. Dec. 52, 471 N.E.2d 581 (4 Dist. 1984).
 

     JURY INSTRUCTIONS
 

     --CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
   Where, in a prosecution for forgery, the circumstantial evidence against defendant was more damning than the direct evidence, and any omission in referring to circumstantial evidence could only have been to defendant's advantage, the failure to give the jury a circumstantial evidence instruction was harmless error. People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975).
 

     --DOCUMENT CAPABLE OF DEFRAUDING
   Defendant was denied a fair trial because of the grave error of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury regarding the element that the document be apparently capable of defrauding another, and because the jury was not otherwise so informed by the court or counsel. People v. Turner, 179 Ill. App. 3d 510, 128 Ill. Dec. 159, 534 N.E.2d 179 (2 Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 565, 133 Ill. Dec. 676, 541 N.E.2d 1114 (1989).
   Any failure of the court to specify to the jury that it was incumbent upon the state to prove that a check was apparently capable of defrauding was harmless error, if error at all. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     --ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE
   Jury instruction given on the offense of forgery which did not include an element of the offense and did not properly instruct on a question for the fact finder was erroneous. People v. Mattingly, 180 Ill. App. 3d 573, 129 Ill. Dec. 573, 536 N.E.2d 257 (4 Dist.), appeal denied, 136 Ill. Dec. 599, 545 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. 1989).
 

     --ERROR CAUSING REVERSAL
   Conviction for forgery was reversed due to admission of improper evidence and erroneous jury instructions. People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 44 N.E.2d 32 (1942).
 

     --HELD SUFFICIENT
   Instructions were sufficient to charge the offense of forgery. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 350 N.E.2d 890 (5 Dist. 1976).
 

     --INTENT
   Instruction stating that if the defendant passed a bogus check, as charged in the indictment, the intent to defraud would be presumed, was an erroneous instruction for failure to require knowledge by the defendant of fictitious character of the check. People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, 41 N.E.2d 750 (1942).
 

     LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
 

     --DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
   Deceptive practices is not a lesser offense of forgery; hence the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to that effect. People v. Baylor, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 324 N.E.2d 255 (2 Dist. 1975).
   Where a defendant's conduct constituted forgery, he could be prosecuted for that crime even though the conduct also constituted the lesser crime of deceptive practices under the more specific and recent statute. People v. Roberts, 27 Ill. App. 3d 489, 326 N.E.2d 116 (3 Dist. 1975).
 

     --FUEL TAX VIOLATIONS
   Where indictments against defendant for alleged violations of Illinois Motor Fuel Tax (IMFTA) (35 ILCS 505/1 et seq.) were dismissed, subsequent indictments for forgery could not be barred by double jeopardy because forgery was not a lesser included offense of violations of the IMFTA for nonpayment of motor fuel taxes and failure to obtain a license to distribute motor fuel. People v. Schram, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 220 Ill. Dec. 225, 672 N.E.2d 1237 (1 Dist. 1996).
 

     FORGERY
   Attempt theft is not a lesser included offense of forgery. People v. Austin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 495, 48 Ill. Dec. 939, 417 N.E.2d 671 (1 Dist. 1981).
 

     MAKES OR ALTERS
 

     --ENDORSEMENT INCLUDED
   Proof that defendant endorsed a check in another person's name was, as a matter of law, sufficient proof of a making of the check because in the context of the forgery statute, "makes" includes "endorses." People v. Connell, 91 Ill. App. 3d 326, 46 Ill. Dec. 743, 414 N.E.2d 796 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --QUESTION OF LAW
   The issue of whether "making" included an endorsement was one of statutory construction, and was a question of law for the court to decide. People v. Connell, 91 Ill. App. 3d 326, 46 Ill. Dec. 743, 414 N.E.2d 796 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     MULTIPLE OFFENSES
 

     --SINGLE ACT
   Where information charged defendant with forgery in that he knowingly issued and delivered a check with the intent to defraud, and with attempt theft in that he attempted to obtain by deception the control of funds from the bank, he could not be convicted of multiple offenses arising from his act in presenting the forged check to the bank for payment; the judgment of the trial court for forgery was affirmed, and the judgment for attempt theft was vacated. People v. Austin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 495, 48 Ill. Dec. 939, 417 N.E.2d 671 (1 Dist. 1981).
 

     OFFENSES DISTINGUISHED
   There is a difference between forgery and theft; forgery requires only the intent to defraud and is complete upon the issuance or delivery of a fraudulent document, while theft requires unlawfully obtaining control over the property or money of another. People v. Austin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 495, 48 Ill. Dec. 939, 417 N.E.2d 671 (1 Dist. 1981).
   Forgery, and having possession of a forged instrument with intent to pass the same, are distinct felonies. People v. Chronister, 379 Ill. 617, 41 N.E.2d 750 (1942).
 

     PROBATION REVOCATION
 

     --HARMLESS ERROR
   Where the only written notice given the defendant was the probation revocation petition and it alleged that he had violated his probation by committing the offense of forgery, and trial court, contrary to the petition, revoked his probation on the basis that the state had shown that the defendant committed the separate, distinct, and non-included offense of deceptive practices, the defendant did not have any notice or any opportunity to defend against the deceptive practices charge; however, since the defendant was convicted in a jury trial of the forgery referred to in the petition to revoke for probation that the error was harmless and did not require a reversal and a new revocation proceeding based upon the mere proof of the conviction. People v. Good, 66 Ill. App. 3d 32, 22 Ill. Dec. 777, 383 N.E.2d 253 (4 Dist. 1978).
 

     PROSECUTORIAL COMMENTS
 

     --UNAVAILABLE WITNESS
   Where unavailable witness' testimony would have been relevant to the crucial issue of defendant's knowledge of the forgery, the state's comments on that witness' failure to testify substantially prejudiced defendant whose conviction for forgery was therefore reversed. People v. Wills, 151 Ill. App. 3d 418, 104 Ill. Dec. 278, 502 N.E.2d 775 (2 Dist. 1986).
 

     SENTENCE
 

     --CONSPIRACY
   Where defendant was convicted of conspiracy and forgery, based primarily on testimony of a co-defendant, who passed a forged check, that the defendant asked him to pass the check and later divide the proceeds, it was error for defendant to be convicted of both the inchoate crime of conspiracy as well as the principal offense of forgery. People v. Simmons, 21 Ill. App. 3d 310, 315 N.E.2d 226 (3 Dist. 1974).
 

     --DISCRETION OF COURT
   Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant convicted of forgery probation, where at the time of offense defendant was on probation for a deceptive practices charge involving a similar "check-cashing" incident. People v. Tervin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656 (4 Dist. 1974).
   Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant convicted of forgery probation, where at the time of offense defendant was on probation for a deceptive practices charge involving a similar "check-cashing" incident. People v. Tervin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 409, 318 N.E.2d 656 (4 Dist. 1974).
 

     --ENTITLEMENT TO CREDIT
   Defendant was not entitled to credit against his sentences of residential burglary and forgery, for time served on a contempt sentence. People v. Sanders, 115 Ill. App. 3d 364, 71 Ill. Dec. 208, 450 N.E.2d 896 (4 Dist. 1983).
 

     --HELD EXCESSIVE
   Although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's probation granted after defendant plead guilty to forging check in the amount of $14.25, defendant's sentence of two to five years was excessive, and was reduced to one to three years, where, after the trial judge had announced that he was revoking defendant's probation, the chief probation officer, without any verification, was permitted to recite into the record that the defendant had been incarcerated for several offenses. People v. Spinnie, 7 Ill. App. 3d 711, 288 N.E.2d 510 (5 Dist. 1972).
 

     --HELD NOT EXCESSIVE
   The trial court considered the appropriate mitigating factors in reaching a sentence of four years' imprisonment for Class 3 felonies as demonstrated by the fact that defendant received a sentence of four years' imprisonment, slightly more than the minimum for these Class 3 felonies. People v. Morris, 106 Ill. App. 3d 689, 62 Ill. Dec. 372, 435 N.E.2d 1344 (4 Dist. 1982).
   Defendant's minimum sentence of two years for forgery was not excessive in the light of defendant's record of convictions for the offense involved, and the maximum sentence of ten years was proper in the light of the apparent chronic nature of defendant's conduct and his admitted need for rehabilitation. People v. Reynolds, 38 Ill. App. 3d 788, 348 N.E.2d 864 (4 Dist. 1976).
   Defendant's sentence for the offense of forgery, although quite close to the maximum allowable for the felony, was not an abuse of trial court discretion. People v. Schmidt, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 324 N.E.2d 246 (3 Dist. 1975).
   The sentence of one to five years for conviction of forgery and pledging fraudulent stock was not excessive. People v. Young, 19 Ill. App. 3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1974).
   Sentence of one to eight years upon a guilty plea to forgery was not excessive for conviction of forgery. People v. Lewton, 2 Ill. App. 3d 882, 277 N.E.2d 781 (1972).
   Sentence of three to five years in the penitentiary on a plea of guilty to the crime of forgery was not too severe. People v. Dye, 122 Ill. App. 2d 480, 258 N.E.2d 589 (4 Dist. 1970).
   A penitentiary sentence of from two to six years for forgery was not excessive and should not be reduced. People v. Dzielski, 130 Ill. App. 2d 581, 264 N.E.2d 426 (2 Dist. 1970).
   Where the facts did not remotely suggest that a reduction in the maximum sentence would bring about a more speedy rehabilitation of the defendant and where the sentence was within the limits prescribed by the legislature, for the offense of forgery, and provided a reasonable spread between the minimum and maximum for timely rehabilitation, it did not appear to be a departure from the spirit and the purpose of the law which would justify the appellate court in reducing the sentence. People v. Siegmund, 118 Ill. App. 2d 338, 254 N.E.2d 189 (4 Dist. 1969).
   The sentence of five to 14 years was not unduly harsh and severe, where $45.00 was involved and the sentence was within the limits allowed by statute, and where defendant had repeated offenses for the crime of forgery. People v. Haynes, 73 Ill. App. 2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 489 (4 Dist. 1966).
 

     --PROBATION
   Where nearly ten years had elapsed since defendant's previous conviction for forgery, and the conditions revealed by character witness testimony indicated good prospects for defendant's future good behavior, three years of probation was an appropriate penalty for forgery. People v. Palmer, 2 Ill. App. 3d 934, 274 N.E.2d 658 (3 Dist. 1971).
 

     --SAME TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE
   In the prosecution for forgery and pledging fraudulent stock, both charges grew out of one transaction, and only one sentence could have been imposed for the two offenses, and thus the trial court should have specified the offense for which the sentence was imposed. People v. Young, 19 Ill. App. 3d 455, 311 N.E.2d 609 (4 Dist. 1974).
 

     --TERM PROPER
   Three to ten year sentence was proper, where defendant had an extensive history of prior offenses, including two burglary convictions and a previous conviction for deceptive practices, and the check involved in the instant offense was, according to defendant's statement, one of 15 or more such checks passed in the period of a week. People v. Elliott, 10 Ill. App. 3d 941, 295 N.E.2d 256 (5 Dist. 1973).
   Sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than six nor more than 14 years was proper. People v. Hibbler, 1 Ill. App. 3d 263, 274 N.E.2d 101 (5 Dist. 1971).
   Where the court informed defendant that he could be sentenced for a period in excess of ten years due to the possibility of consecutive sentences for the multiple charges in the indictment, which defendant said he understood, and the actual concurrent sentences of two to six years imposed were within the maximum stated in the admonition of the court, defendant was not entitled to reversal on claim that the court improperly informed him that he could be imprisoned for up to ten years, whereas a conviction for forgery actually subjected him to a potential 14 year sentence. People v. Blumenthal, 1 Ill. App. 3d 189, 273 N.E.2d 668 (1 Dist. 1971).
 

     --UPON GUILTY PLEA
   Upon plea of guilty to a charge of forgery, sentence of not less than three nor more than twelve years was proper. People v. Davis, 109 Ill. App. 2d 278, 248 N.E.2d 532 (4 Dist. 1969).
 

     THEFT
 

     --DISTINCTIONS
   The legislature has chosen to distinguish the culpability of one who obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of another under the crime of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1) from one who intends to defraud another through the use of an altered instrument under the crime of forgery (this section). These distinctions are not so unreasonable, and the range of sentences is not so disproportionate, as to be constitutionally impermissible. People v. Henson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 183, 90 Ill. Dec. 761, 482 N.E.2d 1044 (4 Dist. 1985).
 

     --DISTINGUISHED
   Attempt theft is not a lesser included offense of forgery; forgery requires only the intent to defraud and is complete upon the issuance or delivery of a fraudulent document, while theft requires unlawfully obtaining control over the property or money of another. People v. Austin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 495, 48 Ill. Dec. 939, 417 N.E.2d 671 (1 Dist. 1981).
 

     UNAUTHORIZED USE
 

     --STOLEN CREDIT CARD
   The fact that a credit card had been stolen in a burglary was probative of defendant's unauthorized use of the card in a forgery prosecution, although the fact did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was defendant who committed the burglary and stole the card. People v. Reynolds, 85 Ill. App. 3d 549, 40 Ill. Dec. 833, 407 N.E.2d 64 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     VENUE
 

     --ACT OF DEFENDANT
   In a prosecution for forgery, venue was proper in the county in which defendant released, surrendered, or handed over letter to be faxed to complainant, whose receipt of the fax occurred in another county. People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 164 Ill. Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991).
 

     --CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
   Due to the secretive nature of the offense in forgery cases, venue often must be proved by circumstantial, rather than direct evidence; thus, in order for a party to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, the law allows inferences from established facts. People v. Hagan, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 164 Ill. Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991).
   This section required proof that defendant actually made the false prescription in county alleged; however, venue could be sustained by resorting to circumstantial evidence. People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 242, 46 Ill. Dec. 698, 414 N.E.2d 751 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --ESTABLISHED
   Where a limousine driver testified that all the events leading to defendant's arrest occurred within Du Page County, the check at issue was found near where the police first encountered defendant in Du Page County, and the check, in defendant's handwriting, dated November 27, 1986 (the date the check was found), was in an amount sufficient to pay for defendant's limousine charges, which defendant had earlier said he would pay for by check, the only rational conclusion was that defendant made the check out while riding with the driver throughout the hours immediately preceding his encounter with the police in Du Page County; where defendant's home was in Du Page County, and there was no evidence that defendant made the check in another county, venue was established. People v. Turner, 179 Ill. App. 3d 510, 128 Ill. Dec. 159, 534 N.E.2d 179 (2 Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 565, 133 Ill. Dec. 676, 541 N.E.2d 1114 (1989).
   Where a check was cashed at a bank in this state, and both defendants resided in the same county as the bank, as did the person whose name was forged, the circumstances shown by the evidence warranted the inference that it was endorsed by the defendant in that county. People v. Dauphin, 53 Ill. App. 2d 433, 203 N.E.2d 166 (2 Dist. 1964).
 

     --ORIGIN OF FACSIMILE
   Venue would have been proper in either county where the forged document was sent by a facsimile machine, or in the county where the document was received. People v. Hagan, 199 Ill. App. 3d 267, 145 Ill. Dec. 322, 556 N.E.2d 1224 (2 Dist. 1990), aff'd, 145 Ill. 2d 287, 164 Ill. Dec. 578, 583 N.E.2d 494 (1991).
 

     --QUESTION OF FACT
   Regardless of whether jury instructions are required to be tendered stating that the state must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, venue is to be decided by the trier of fact, whenever it is a material element of the offense. People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 242, 46 Ill. Dec. 698, 414 N.E.2d 751 (5 Dist. 1980).
 

     --UNCONTROVERTED
   There was no need to instruct the jury in a forgery case as to venue where venue was not a controverted issue in the case. People v. Turner, 179 Ill. App. 3d 510, 128 Ill. Dec. 159, 534 N.E.2d 179 (2 Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 565, 133 Ill. Dec. 676, 541 N.E.2d 1114 (1989).

LEGAL PERIODICALS
   For comment, "Signed, Sealed, Delivered ...Disbarred? Notarial Misconduct by Attorneys", see 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1085 (1998).